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POLITICAL RISK INSURANCE AND THE
OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT
CORPORATION: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE
PRIVATE SECTOR?
Elizabeth A. Kessler"
Since 1969, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC") has
insured American investments abroad against political risk in order to assist
both developing nations and American investors by encouraging American
investment abroad.' What distinguishes OPIC from other legislative
attempts to aid developing nations, assist American investors abroad, or
improve the United States' export position is that since its inception, OPIC
has consistently made a profit and continues to operate at an annual
surplus.2  Yet despite the consistent profitability of OPIC's investment
* Law Clerk to Judge Richard Cardamone of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.
1. OPIC was formed as an independent government agency in corporate form in 1969
under its enabling statute, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2200 (1969), and began operations in 1971.
For a brief history, see Robert B. Shanks, Insuring Investments and Loans Against
Currency Inconvertibility, Expropriation, and Political Violence, 9 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 417, 417-21 (1986).
2. While OPIC experiences continued success as the only federal agency earning an
annual profit, some attention should be paid to the fact that OPIC's start-up costs of over
$100 million are not usually counted in assessing its annual profitability. See Gary H.
Sampliner, Note, The 1981 OPIC Amendments and Reagan's "Newer Directions - in Third
World Development Policy, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 181, 206-07 (1982). However,
the 1981 amendments included a provision requiring OPIC to return 25% of its net income
each year to the United States Treasury until its start-up costs were repaid. Foreign
Assistance Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-65, § 10, 95 Stat. 1024 (codified as
22 U.S.C. § 2200(b)(1985)) (repealed 1985). Despite that provision's subsequent repeal
in 1985, Foreign Assistance Act Amendments of 1985, Pub. L No. 99-204, § 15, 99 Stat.
1676 (1985), most commentators see OPIC's financial position as secure. Doug
Wessinger, Note, International Trade Reauthorization for the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation, 12 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 251, 260-61 (1982); Shanks, supra note 1, at
430. Further, OPIC's financial success renders the $100 million start-up costs of negligible
significance; in 1986, for example, OPIC's net income was $101.2 million. John S.
Diaconis, Political Risk Insurance: OPIC's Use of a 'Fiduciary Agent" to Facilitate
Resolution of Subrogation Claims, 23 INT'L LAW. 271, 274 (1989).
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insurance program and despite the fact that until 1978 legislators continued
to express hopes that the private sector would take over OPIC's insurance
role,3 private insurers still provide only very limited coverage of overseas
investments against political risk.
If political risk insurance is so profitable, why are private insurers not
writing the policies? While a handful of private insurers underwrite a
limited number of political risk insurance policies,4 their coverage does not
approach that of OPIC. If, as several authors suggest, political risks are
too difficult to measure accurately and premiums are too difficult to
calculate correctly,5 then something should seem suspicious about the
"insurance" provided by OPIC. If not a properly functioning insurance
scheme, OPIC investment insurance might merely be a thinly veiled
subsidy to American business or even an outright grant to politically risky
less developed countries.6
An explanation of OPIC's success requires examining its structure as
an international policy tool. Although OPIC structures its investment
insurance program following basic insurance principles, OPIC's objectives
differ markedly from those of private insurers. OPIC's goals are to
encourage economic development abroad and assist American investors
compete with the profit motive and the reserves principle, both of which
drive the private insurance market. While private sector political risk
3. Until 1978, OPIC was instructed in its reauthorizations to begin transferring its
insurance program to either the private sector or to multilateral organizations. Overseas
Private Investment Corporation Amendments Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-390, § 2(1), 88
Stat. 763 (codified as 22 U.S.C. § 2194(A)(2) (1976)) (repealed 1978).
4. The private sector offers privately written political risk insurance which differs in
many respects from the investment insurance offered by OPIC. Although private coverage
is available to some extent for expropriation risks faced by overseas investors, private
insurers tend to be less willing to insure against the risks of inconvertibility and political
violence covered by OPIC. Shanks, supra note 1, at 420. Private insurance also differs
in practice by covering mainly safe investments made by established companies and by
usually insuring only investments made in countries where insurers have established
operations. P. George Bullitt & Laura I. Lagomarsino, Protecting Intellectual and
Property Rights Abroad, 5 INT'L TAX & BUS. LAW. 283, 298 (1987). The number of
insurance firms offering private coverage is also extremely limited: less than 12 insurance
firms offer political risk insurance and over half of the political risk insurance offered by
the private sector is underwritten by Lloyd's of London. Il
5. R. Michael Allen & W. Kip Viscusi, Insuring the Expropriation Risks of Multination-
al Firms, 11 STAN. J. INT'L L. 153, 156 (1976). Bullitt & Lagomarsino, supra note 4, at
298-99.
6. Some authors suggest that OPIC insurance acts not only as a subsidy to American
businesses, but that it is also a subsidy which has made private American involvement in
overseas investment insurance unprofitable. Allen & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 160.
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insurance developed as a profitable outgrowth of the marine insurance
business, the United States Congress designed OPIC overseas investment
insurance primarily to enact foreign policy goals inexpensively, not to earn
a profit. OPIC's enabling statute furthers OPIC's stated purpose, which is
"to mobilize and facilitate the participation of the United States private
capital and skills in the economic and social development of less developed
friendly countries and areas ... ,,. Numerous provisions in line with that
goal restrict OPIC's ability to offer political risk insurance. For instance,
some restrictions limit the countries in which overseas investments will be
insured while others encourage issuing insurance to smaller American
businesses seeking to do business overseas.
Yet these restrictions do not explain the low level of private sector
participation in the political risk insurance business. Legislative provisions
may alter OPIC's character as an insurer, but OPIC nevertheless makes
money in the insurance business. If private underwriters can barely make
a profit in a narrowly defined political risk insurance market (let alone the
possibility that they should earn greater profits since they are free from the
congressional restraints on OPIC), either OPIC has circumvented traditional
insurance principles or inefficiency impairs the private market. This article
examines what has happened to limit private sector participation in offering
profitable political risk insurance. It concludes that complex constraints on
the private political risk insurance market support a continued reliance on
OPIC and similar programs designed by other countries to provide political
risk insurance.
I. How OPIC OVERSEAS INVESTMENT INSURANCE
OPERATES AS TRADITIONAL INSURANCE
To understand the puzzling gap between private and public political
risk insurance programs requires a preliminary examination of how OPIC's
overseas investment insurance is structured to operate as a traditional
insurance scheme. OPIC political risk insurance primarily works like
traditional insurance and earns a profit by applying variations of the same
insurance principles private insurers must obey to stay in business. While
OPIC was principally designed to encourage economic development in less
developed countries and to help smaller American businesses invest abroad,
it must nonetheless apply customary insurance principles.
7. OvERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION, INVESTMENT INSURANCE
HANDBOOK 3, 11 (1989) [hereinafter OPIC HANDBOOK].
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OPIC's foreign policy goals are stated in its enabling statute: to
"mobilize and facilitate the participation of United States private capital
and skills in the economic and social development of less developed
friendly countries and areas, thereby complementing the development
objectives of the United States .... . OPIC does so in part by insuring
certain American investments abroad against political risk, thus operating
as a classic insurance scheme.
OPIC acts like other insurers by following the reserves principle and
the law of large numbers. Insurers structure traditional insurance schemes
to cover loss by first applying the reserves principle, under which a large
number of risks are aggregated into a pool to reduce the impact of
expected loss on each member of the pool. Theoretically, insurance
premiums should equal the total loss expected divided by the number of
insureds. The sum of the premiums should supply the reserves from which
claims are paid out. For investment insurance to function as true
insurance, and not merely as a group savings plan, insurers must first apply
the reserves principle and then also follow what is descriptively referred
to as the "law of large numbers."
The law of large numbers means that a sufficiently large number of
risks must be pooled in order for insurers to predict accurately the expected
amount of loss. Without an adequately-sized risk pool, insurers could
neither accurately predict losses nor correctly set premiums; their schemes
would be inefficient, if not unprofitable. When insurers predict loss more
accurately, they decrease the amount of reserves they must hold and thus
the premiums they must charge. Insurer and insured may then invest those
freed resources elsewhere. This ability to increase the productive use of
resources distinguishes insurance from group savings. Of key importance,
a true insurance plan should actually reduce risk at a societal level, where
risk is the effective loss to society, rather than merely spread risk among
individuals.
Applying the law of large numbers presents particular difficulties for
overseas investment insurance like that OPIC offers. First, only about 100
less developed countries host foreign investments, and a similarly limited
number of investment projects create business in those countries. Second,
risks that statistically occur at very low rates, like the risks of expropriation
or revolution, pose serious prediction difficulties for underwriters like
OPIC.
While evidently not insurmountable, the complications impeding risk
calculation in investment insurance far exceed those in more traditional
8. 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1988).
[Vol. 13206
OPIC AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR
insurance schemes, such as life and automobile insurance in which pools
of insureds vastly outnumber the businesses in the investment insurance
market. In large part, inaccuracies in predictions result from uncertainties
in the occurrence of those events constituting political risk.9 Not only are
such events rare but, more importantly, their occurrence is historically
linked. Political activity leading to the damage, destruction, or seizure of
property can not simply be explained or described as easily as what causes
accidental fires. To illustrate, being struck by lightning is, like the
expropriation of an American corporation abroad, a rare event. The
probability of many people being simultaneously struck by lighting is even
more rare, but the significant difference is that such probabilities remain
minute yet calculable figures that, without some fundamental physical
change in the universe, will stay constant from decade to decade and even
century to century. In stark contrast, historical forces are neither under-
stood nor calculable by actuaries.
Limitations on accuracy notwithstanding, OPIC officials currently
estimate political risks based, in part, on past occurrences, past claims, and
on other factors that presumably could lead to future claims. But as one
OPIC official put it, in political risk insurance "there is no expected
claim.""° Despite that observation, estimates must still be made. One
distinct advantage OPIC possesses over private insurers in calculating risk
is its access to confidential Central Intelligence Agency and State
Department information.1 ' With the aid of such information, OPIC's
assessment of political risk analyses presumably improves. Unfortunately,
with no comparable private insurance scheme operating, it is impossible to
determine exactly how much premiums would differ between OPIC and
private insurers due to OPIC's confidential government information. Both
lack of experience in political analysis and information problems in
estimating the risk faced in a particular country contribute to deterring
private insurers from offering overseas investment insurance policies.
Beyond the hurdle of following the law of large numbers, to properly
function as an insurance scheme, whether in the private or public sector,
9. Allen & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 156. "[Alssessment [of expropriation risks]
requires subjective judgments rather than exclusive reliance on objective frequencies, such
as the death rates used in setting life insurance premium levels .... A standard pitfall is
that the probability assessors underestimate the likelihood of rare events." Id.
10. Telephone interview with Kenneth Hansen, General Counsel's Office, The Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (Mar. 13, 1990).
11. Bullitt & Lagomarsino, supra note 4, at 302. "Given OPIC's access to confidential
country risk information... it is difficult to conceive of how the private market could
adequately compete with it or fill its place should it be disbanded." Id.
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insurance must not only cover a sufficiently large risk pool but must also
address various obstacles. For one, and of particular relevance in the field
of political risk insurance, insurers must only cover independent risks.
Were the individual risks insured not independent events, potential loss
could be enormous. The classic example is risk of damage caused by
nuclear war, which is not insurable since, as the argument is most often
stated, resulting loss would be universally high. In the context of
investment insurance, a scheme could quickly go bankrupt if a nation
hosting numerous insured investments began systematically expropriating
foreign businesses. If a scheme held reserves in the amount of this
possibly devastating loss, risk reduction would be defeated and insurance
would be nothing more than savings for a monsoon day.
OPIC compensates for problems posed by dependent risks partly by
limiting its liability. OPIC's enabling statute states that "[n]ot more than
10 per centum of the maximum contingent liability of investment insurance
which the Corporation is permitted to have outstanding under Section
2195(a)(1) of this title shall be issued to a single investor." 2 Limiting
exposure through any one investor or in any one nation ensures that risks
remain separate. Diversifying across investors and nations reduces
exposure and decreases the chance of an overwhelming surge of claims.
OPIC further addresses the possibility of devastating claims due to
unavoidable inaccuracies in prediction by backing investment insurance
with the full faith and credit of the United States." Doing so theoretical-
ly reassures investors that insurance claims will be paid, enables premiums
to remain at more attractive rates for investors, and allows the scheme to
operate unparalyzed by apocalyptic possibilities, especially in its early
years when estimates are roughly cast.
Backing OPIC insurance policies with the full faith and credit of the
United States, an option not available to private sector insurers, accom-
plishes risk reduction by decreasing the amount of reserves required. By
insuring through the full faith and credit of the United States, the OPIC
insurance scheme does not entail OPIC actually holding all of its effective
reserves. Investments are insured ultimately both through reserves held
and through the backing of the United States. Some of what OPIC would
hold if it were a private insurer, that is, the portion of what would normally
be calculated as reserves but in OPIC's case is covered by the United
States Treasury, remains in the economy; societal efficiency increases just
as it does from reserves released by private insurers when risks can be
12. 22 U.S.C. § 2194(a)(3) (1988).
13. 22 U.S.C. § 2197(c) (1988).
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calculated more accurately by applying the law of large numbers. Using
the full faith and credit of the United States acts as a hedge against
uncertainty and error sufficient to satisfy threshold requirements in
establishing an operational investment insurance scheme.
Once past the necessity of covering independent risks, OPIC, like all
underwriters, must confront two classic insurance phenomena to remain
solvent: moral hazard and adverse selection. First, the effects of moral
hazard challenge the continued operation of an insurance scheme because
behavior of the insured or third parties may change in the presence of
insurance; risky behavior is likely to increase once an activity is insured.
Then, when an activity has been insured, claims for injury reparation are
also more likely to be made, especially in comparison with those claims
that, in the absence of insurance, would be pursued through litigation.
In the context of overseas investment insurance, countries may be
more likely to take expropriatory action knowing that investors have
purchased political risk insurance. Likewise, having insured their own
investments, corporations might take fewer precautions to insure the
goodwill of host governments or might neglect to pursue interim measures
like negotiation or arbitration to limit claims.
Certain contractual terms and conditions on OPIC insurance policies
attempt to counteract moral hazard in much the same way traditional
insurance schemes try to limit behavioral changes in the presence of
insurance. Insurance schemes typically employ particular methods to
defuse moral hazard and thus prevent bankruptcy. By requiring deductibles
(making the insured pay a fixed amount each time a claim is made),
coinsurance (not covering the entire loss suffered) and exclusions (omitting
certain losses from coverage entirely, like excluding coverage of suicide in
life insurance policies), insurers deter frivolous claims or at least claims
that would not be made in the absence of insurance. While OPIC
insurance does not provide for a deductible, OPIC insurance withholds
payment to the insured for a one year waiting period from the time of loss
if the loss resulted from a politically-motivated event.14 Insured corpora-
tions are further obliged to take measures to minimize the damage to their
investments during the waiting period. The waiting period functions
somewhat as a deductible by requiring the insured to bear some arbitrary
amount of a claim, i.e., the lost profits and lost interest on the damaged
capital for a year, thereby deterring risky behavior on the part of the
insured.
14. Steven Franklin & Gerald T. West, The Overseas Private Investment Corporation
Amendments Act of 1978: A Reaffirmation of the Developmental Role of Investment
Insurance, 14 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 24 (1979).
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OPIC insurance additionally deters risky behavior by covering less
than 100% of the losses suffered by an insured.'5 This straightforward
coinsurance provision parallels that found in the coinsurance clause of any
domestic auto insurance policy. Further, OPIC investment insurance
generally covers only the book value of an insured's physical assets in the
host country.1 6 Insurance under the standard contract covers neither lost
profits nor replacement costs, thus forcing insured corporations to bear an
additional portion of the true loss suffered.
Since OPIC investment insurance covers three specific categories of
loss, it naturally excludes many types of politically-motivated losses.
OPIC insurance compensates only for loss due to expropriation,17
currency inconvertibility, 8 and political violence. 9 Most notably, the
term political violence has covered civil strife, including most terrorist acts,
since 1981.2o OPIC coverage excludes any type of damage which the
15. OPIC insurance generally covers only 90% of insured investments. OPIC
HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 8. Under some circumstances coverage will extend to less
than 90% of an investment. I&
16. Under limited circumstances OPIC offers replacement cost coverage for an
additional premium. I& at 5. OPIC's handbook states that
[t]he basic measure of compensation is the original cost of the covered property
not to exceed the lesser of the cost of repair or replacement or, if the damaged
equipment remains commercially operable, the reduction in the fair market
value of the asset. Compensation is limited to the insured's proportionate
interest in the assets of the foreign enterprise. A replacement cost coverage is
also available, which provides compensation up to twice the lost equipment's
original cost, provided the equipment is actually replaced in the host country.
Id.
17. OPIC investment insurance contracts cover both total expropriation and so-called
creeping expropriations, defining expropriatory action as that authorized or condoned by
the host country's government and having an impact on the properties or operations of the
foreign enterprise. I& at 4.
18. OPIC defines inconvertibility as either action taken by exchange authorities denying
access to foreign exchange or the failure of authorities to act within a certain time period
on an application for foreign exchange. Id at 3-4. OPIC enjoys an advantage unavailable
to the private sector when it insures against currency inconvertibility. The United States
can exchange local currency for dollars and then through its Embassy or local agency
offices use the local currency in exchange for goods and services. Private insurers often
bear the added cost of being stuck with useless currency. Id.
19. OPIC contracts define political violence as "violent acts undertaken with the
primary intent of achieving a political objective, such as declared or undeclared war, hostile
action by national or international forces, civil war, revolution, insurrection, or civil strife."
Id. at 4.
20. 22 U.S.C. § 2194(a)(1)(C) (1988). See generally Sampliner, Note, supra note 2,
at 191-98.
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insured cannot prove to be politically motivated, and the burden of proof
lies squarely on the insured making the claim. Thus, if an investor were
to bomb its own facility, which perhaps had become unprofitable or
suffered financial loss due to uninsurable labor strikes, the policy would
not cover the loss as a loss resulting from a terrorist strike because the
investor could not prove a political motivation behind the attack.
Excluding self-induced losses, like excluding suicide from coverage under
a life insurance policy, reduces moral hazard simply by deterring self-in-
flicted loss.
OPIC also excludes certain activity as too high risk by limiting the
countries where investments may be insured. OPIC insures only in those
countries that have signed a bilateral investment treaty with the United
States; thus investments in nations deemed most likely to expropriate are
excluded from coverage.2" Limitations on insured activities exclude very
high risk activities just as provisions in school insurance policies exclude
coverage for injuries to students from trampoline accidents.
In addition to moral hazard, insurance schemes must counteract the
phenomenon of adverse selection, the process by which those with a high
likelihood of loss will seek out insurance and those with a low expectation
of loss will opt out of an insurance pool. If an insurance scheme fails to
counter the effects of adverse selection, its premiums will be too low in
relation to the composition of its pool of insureds and it will go bankrupt.
Insurers traditionally offset adverse selection by segregating insureds into
separate pools based on risks faced and then charging premiums based on
riskiness. Risk segregation allows higher premiums to restrain high risk
activities and lower premiums to permit participants in low risk activities
to purchase insurance at reasonable rates. OPIC's parallel might be an
attempt to segregate risk by country, but in fact, unlike the national rate
segregation practiced by private insurers, OPIC's rates do not vary from
country to country. Negative political ramifications to the United States
might result from labeling a country high risk, and this has been argued to
be the primary reason behind OPIC's uniform insurance rate across
countries.
22
21. Bilateral investment treaties usually set out a broad range of policy objectives to
encourage foreign investment in a host country and provide for arbitration in case of
disputes. See generally DEPARTMENT OF STATE, UNrrED STATEs TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS. Currently over 100 nations have been labelled friendly less
developed countries with which the United States has signed treaties agreeing to the
operation of OPIC insurance programs. OPIC HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 8-9.
22. Allen & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 163.
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Adverse selection may be less of an obstacle to establishing a
functioning insurance scheme for OPIC since the reasons corporations
purchase OPIC insurance segment the market. One of the reasons
investors purchase investment insurance is to lower the hurdle of high costs
involved in investing in less developed countries.' Investments in those
circumstances would otherwise not be made. In other cases, bankers
reduce their risk when financing overseas projects by requiring investment
insurance as a condition on loans.' China, as a host government,
requires all overseas investors entering into joint-venture agreements there
to purchase political risk insurance.2 When investors have the choice of
buying insurance, investors heading to low risk areas usually prefer to bear
political risk themselves. So the market for political risk insurance is in
practice fairly well-def'med. Additionally, OPIC excludes investment in the
most high-risk areas from coverage. The levels in between may not be
clear enough to permit any meaningful segregation of risks.
Despite some of the questions raised by adverse selection, addressing
the problems of moral hazard enables OPIC insurance to operate basically
as a traditional insurance scheme. The measures taken by OPIC, from
requiring waiting periods and coinsurance to excluding certain activities
from coverage, could equally be used by private insurers offering overseas
investment insurance. Even OPIC's requirement that countries sign a
bilateral investment treaty with the United States could'be applied by
private insurers. The private sector may lack the diplomatic power to
encourage countries to sign such treaties, but nothing would prevent private
insurers from piggy-backing off treaties already signed. Moreover,
countries that had not yet signed investment treaties with the United States
would conceivably seek to do so independently if it became evident that
the unavailability of insurance made foreign investors reluctant to bring in
capital.
Even given the entire array of unique problems posed by political risk
insurance, nothing should prevent the private sector from applying
solutions similar to those employed by OPIC. In fact, and quite expected-
ly, the investment insurance policies underwritten through the private sector
typically do include deductibles, coinsurance, and exclusions, as well as
23. Franklin & West, supra note 14, at 8-9.
24. Susan Mashkes, Using PoliticaVCredit Risk Insurance to Maximize Financing
Opportunities, 9 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 451,458-59 (1986).
25. Alison Lisa Patrucco, Equity Joint Ventures with the People's Republic of China:
A Puzzle in Politics, Law, and Tradition, 10 HAsTINGs INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 609, 634
(1987).
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other means to reduce the possibility of unsupportably large losses.26 Yet
the coverage available through the private political risk insurance market
remains vastly more limited than that offered through government
sponsored programs like OPIC. Since OPIC has throughout its nearly
twenty year history proven that insuring overseas investments against
political risks can be a profitable business and since private insurers
themselves have successfully underwritten some overseas investment
insurance, the explanation for why the private market is so limited cannot
simply be that political risk insurance is problematic. The explanation
must lie elsewhere.
II. WHY PRIVATE SECTOR POLITICAL
RISK INSURANCE IS SO LIMITED
While private and public sector insurers face similar obstacles in
constructing workable overseas investment insurance schemes, the most
striking difference between the two is the structure of the private market.
Among political risk insurance underwriters, the organization and
operations of private insurers differ extensively from those of government
sponsored schemes like OPIC. What emerge as the peculiarities and
necessities of the private market turn out to be crucial in explaining its
limited size. Those quirks primarily reflect the unique origins of private
sector investment insurance.
In the private sector, political risk insurance did not suddenly appear
as a policy decision in a post-colonial world, but gradually evolved from
marine insurance policies, which had been underwritten by specialist
insurers to cover ships and their cargo since the 1700s. Although in the
past fifteen to twenty years new market entrants without prior experience
in marine insurance have successfully entered the political risk insurance
business, the private market continues to be characterized by a very limited
number of historically strong marine insurers. The leading player remains
Lloyd's of London.27 Lloyd's, which quite unlike any government
program is actually an insurance syndicate of brokers and insurers and not
strictly itself an insurer, presently dominates the private sector political risk
insurance market just as it has dominated the marine insurance market
since the eighteenth century." But expressly underwriting political risks
26. See infra text accompanying notes 34-39.
27. Douglas A. Paul, New Developments in Private Political Risk Insurance and Trade
Finance, 21 INT'L LAW. 709, 710 (1987).
28. Anthony Cassidy, Underwriting Political Risks, C. INS. INST. J., Apr. 1982, at 86.
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emerged as a strictly twentieth century phenomenon in both the private and
public sectors. While public schemes grew from innovative approaches to
providing foreign aid, the private schemes developed from extensions of
coverage of risks associated with trade and doing business by sea. As
such, the private market continues to be characterized by the players and
structures developed for the highly specialized high risk marine insurance
business.
In terms of participating insurers, roughly six major players dominate
the private sector political risk insurance market today. Lloyd's of London
and the American Insurance Group ("AIG") are by far the two oldest and
largest; the other four major players are PanFinancial, Citicorp International
Trade Indemnity, Inc. ("CITI"), Universal Investment Consultants, Ltd.
("UIC"), and Pool d'Assurance des Risques Internationaux et Specieux
("PARIS," only recently created in 1987).29 While other insurers have
offered political risk coverage and may offer one-time policies to favored
clients, their overall participation remains negligible."
In a market that is profitable for private and public insurers, the
limited number of private-sector participants is explained to some extent
by the historical strength of Lloyd's and AIG, by the enormous expertise
required to underwrite political risk policies, and partly by continued
uncertainties concerning future profitability, despite recent optimistic press
coverage and several new market entrants in the late 1980s.31 The
foregoing factors also begin to explain the extremely limited capacity of
the private market. In spite of its profitability and its freedom from the
restrictions limiting OPIC, the private sector annually insures a capacity
only approximately one-fourth to one-fifth of that covered by national
political risk insurance schemes like OPIC and COFACE (Compagnie
Frangaise d'Assurance pour le Commerce Exterieur, the French government
insurance scheme, which, like OPIC, prides itself on its past profitabili-
ty).32 Private insurers collect worldwide annual premiums of just $100
million for onshore coverage, compared with the $400-500 million
29. INVESTMENT INSURANCE INTERNATIONAL (MANAGERS) LTD., POLrrICAL AND
FINANCIAL RISKS IN OVERSEAS CONTRACTS 7-9 (1990) [hereinafter POLITICAL AND
FINANCIAL RISKS].
30. Id at 9.
31. See generally Indemnity Marine, Where Needs Must, THE REVIEW, July 1989, at
10; Cassidy, supra note 28, at 90. Active Underwriter for Polwring Underwriting Agency,
Where Forfeiters Fear to Tread, THE REVIEW, Apr. 1988, at 4 [hereinafter Active
Underwriter].
32. COMPAGNIE FRANCAISE D'ASSURANCE POUR LE COMMERCE EXTERInuR, RAPPORT
D'ACTIvnT 1988 25 (1989).
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collected by government sponsored schemes.3 3 Capacity in the private
sector does fluctuate widely, in part because private insurers possess the
flexibility to grant, alter, or refuse to renew individual policies, while the
national programs tend to be rigidly controlled by particular guidelines.
Yet, even at the height of its fluctuations, private sector capacity never
approached that available through public sector insurers.
The small size of the private political risk insurance market remains
baffling. Not only have experienced insurers been underwriting policies,
but private and public sector insurers have for the most part consistently
made profits. Even with the apparent success in underwriting political risk
insurance, close examination of the workings of the insurance market
reveals that it is the inherent constraints of the marketplace that limit the
availability of political risk insurance in the private sector-precisely those
constraints from which OPIC is free.
The most noteworthy initial feature of the private sector political risk
insurance market is its overall organizational structure, which thoroughly
differs from the workings of public sector programs. Unlike OPIC, which
acts as one insurer often directly approached by insureds, the private
political risk insurance market operates through brokerage, syndicates, and
reinsurance, all of which contribute to the private sector's flexibility.
Brokerage permits a prospective insured to find the right insurer and,
through the broker, to negotiate the most desirable policy based on the
coverage available. The broker will also negotiate a policy that is most
likely to be accepted by underwriters. In conjunction with the private
sector's individualized policies, the role of the broker is central to
obtaining the best terms and conditions for the insured and facilitates
shopping around. On the side of the insurers, the structure of syndicates
and the widespread use of reinsurance broadens the capacity of insurers to
underwrite policies and decreases the exposure of individual insurers.
In the current field of political risk insurance, the underwriters
involved have typically grouped themselves into large syndicates. Brokers
approach leading syndicates and, based on their participation, obtain the
terms, conditions, and agreement to underwrite a certain percentage of the
risk exposure.' Within the syndicates and behind the facade of the well-
known names of the major players a large number of insurers may be
involved at several levels.
Lloyd's of London is not, as commonly believed, the world's largest
insurance company; it describes itself as the world's largest insurance
33. Cassidy, supra note 28, at 89.
34. See generally Paul, supra note 27, at 711.
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market. Four hundred insurance syndicates comprised of tens of thousands
of individual insurers make up Lloyd's and provide its insurance capacity;
270 firms act as accredited Lloyd's brokers." Lloyd's insurers are
independent underwriting syndicates under separate management that have
independent resources and individual responsibility for the policies they
underwrite. Prospective insureds do not contact a Lloyd's insurer but
instead must approach an accredited brokerage fin, usually one specializ-
ing in the placement of political risk insurance like the London based
Investment Insurance International (Managers) Ltd., which upon its
formation in 1972 became the first broker to specialize in placing political
risk insurance.' On an individual basis, a political risk insurance broker
will negotiate the terms of the policy most suited to a prospective insured's
potential investment and country of interest.
The AIG represents the earliest and largest American participant in the
political risk insurance business. AIG began offering political risk
insurance coverage in 1974 to complement the marine, property, and
casualty insurance it already provided to cover investments in over 100
foreign countries.a Somewhat similar to Lloyd's, AIG is comprised of
a large number of member insurance companies. While political risk
insurance is arranged through AIG, specific policies are again underwritten
by one of AIG's member companies. Also similar to how Lloyd's insurers
operate, AIG's member companies widely utilize reinsurance in underwrit-
ing political risk.
Reinsurance operates somewhat automatically, along with the
organization of insurers into syndicates, and involves separate insurers
accepting a certain portion of the same risk. A political risk insurance
policy underwritten through one of the six major private insurers often is
only facially one contract. On the side of the "insurer," a number of
individual insurers belonging to the insurance syndicate will contract in
advance through reinsurance treaties to bear a portion of the risk accepted
by a designated leading underwriter. Additional syndicates may also
decide to join on a case-by-case basis. Reinsurance treaties, actually
private contracts between members of the syndicate, facilitate the process
by predetermining the percentage of risk accepted by insurers whenever
35. LLOYD'S OF LONDON, INFORMATION BROCHURE (1990).
36. INVESTMENT INSURANCE INTERNATIONAL (MANAGERS) LTD., INFORMATION
BROCHURE 1 (1990).
37. AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL UNDERWRITERS, TRADE AND PoLiTIcAL RISK DMvSION
(1991) (Informational Brochure).
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political risk policies are underwritten in accordance with provisions of the
applicable reinsurance treaty.3'
Although the reinsurance treaties are binding agreements, the members
of a syndicate renegotiate them on an annual basis. Individual insurers can
thus readily reevaluate the types of policies and percentages of risks they
agree to underwrite. In addition, insurers underwrite the policies them-
selves only for three-year periods. The formality of reinsurance treaties
makes the process more efficient by eliminating the cost and time that
would be involved if reinsurers negotiated each policy on an individual
basis. Moreover, the short renewal periods give the insurers added
flexibility in selecting the types of investments they are willing to insure
and the percentages of risks they agree to underwrite.
Political risk insurance policies reflect this flexibility in individually
tailored provisions, but basic insurance principles still define and constrain
the provisions of privately written policies just as they do OPIC policies.
Accordingly, the private sector has developed its own approach to the
necessities of premiums, carefully selected insured risks, exclusions,
deductibles, and coinsurance.
The flexibility of private policies emerges perhaps most clearly in their
premium rates, and in this respect they vary widely from the rates found
in OPIC insurance policies.39 As in all insurance, private insurers should
theoretically determine premium rates in accordance with risk. Responding
to the peculiarities of political risk insurance, private underwriters develop
premium rates that do not merely express expected loss, but also incorpo-
rate other factors as well.
Premium rates vary first and foremost in accordance with the capacity
of the market to underwrite political risk insurance. Simply put, when
supply (or the capacity to insure) goes up, the rates charged come down.
Second, insurers may manipulate premium rates to accomplish other goals.
For example, insurers may increase or decrease rates to balance portfolios
and segregate risks. Through this tool they discourage coverage of
investments in either certain geographic regions or in certain fields, like the
extractive industries in which an excessive number of policies are
perceived to have been underwritten.
It is untrue that the private sector charges higher rates across the
board, thereby purportedly discouraging insureds. Moreover, the private
38. Paul, supra note 27, at 711.
39. Premium rates offered on the private insurance market for political risk insurance
currently vary from less than 1% to over 10% per year on the amount at risk. See
POLICAL AND FINANCIAL RISKS, supra note 29, at 9-15.
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sector has no simple advantage or disadvantage over public sector insurers
in terms of its level of premium rates. Premiums in privately written
political risk insurance policies vary widely, from roughly one-half percent
per year on the amount at risk in an investment in North America or
Western Europe to five or six percent for an American investment in
Libya. Private policies, in fact, tend to show generally lower premiums
in low risk activities and higher premiums in high risk activities when
compared with OPIC policies; however no evidence has shown that high
premiums account for the limited size of the private political risk insurance
market.41
In terms of the risk covered, the political nature and high uncertainty
of the risks insured by political risk underwriters force insurers to define
precisely and select carefully the risks they will insure.42 Similar to
public sector insurers, the private market differentiates risks first by
applying the law of large numbers to cover a sufficiently large pool of
insureds while simultaneously avoiding potentially large and disruptive
losses. Free from the statutory provisions governing OPIC insurance and
prohibiting OPIC from insuring some investments, like those in high risk
countries or in countries not having signed bilateral investment treaties with
the United States, private insurers balance their portfolios along several
lines, such as geographic region, type of industry invested in, and
nationality of the investor.43 Unlike OPIC, private underwriters have the
40. Cassidy, supra note 28, at 89.
41. PoLrncAL AND FINANCIAL RISKS, supra note 29, at 9-15.
42. Risks covered in the private sector typically include loss from confiscation,
expropriation, nationalization, license cancellation and non-delivery, embargo, or other
events classified as contract repudiation or frustration. Paul, supra note 27, at 712.
Lloyd's standard R.J. Merrett 1981 Wording defines expropriation as
an act occurring within the policy period not limited to expropriation but
including also confiscation, nationalisation, requisition and sequestration by law,
order or administrative action of the Foreign Government which:
a) Expressly and permanently deprives the Assured of all or part of their
shareholding in the Foreign Enterprise, or
b) Expressly and permanently deprives the Foreign Enterprise of all or part of
its fixed and/or current assets, or
c) Expressly and selectively prevents or restricts the operation of the Foreign
Enterprise so as to cause the permanent and total cessation of its activities.
INvEmE INSURANCE INTERNATIONAL (MANAGERS) LTD., NvESMENT INSURANCE:
THE PRIVATE INSURANCE MARKET, app. I, ann. A, at 1 (Apr. 1989) [hereinafter PRIVATE
INSURANcE MARKET].
43. Cassidy, supra note 28, at 89.
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added freedom to combat the unusual uncertainties of political risk by
liberally selecting provisions on an individual basis.
Private insurers will in practice tend to exclude certain extremely high
risks to avoid large losses. While private insurers theoretically offer
coverage anywhere in the world for a price, some countries during certain
periods will, for all practical purposes, be off limits." Coverage in Cuba
and Libya is currently severely limited.4' Extreme cases of instability
will also tend to repel investors, who bear some portion of any loss
suffered. One problem characteristic of political risk insurance involves
the fact that major losses cannot usually be recouped by underwriting more
business and increasing premiums. In the event of major losses, trade may
halt and there may simply be no future investment contracts to insure."
To compensate for the apparently small number of private insurers
operating in the field of political risk insurance, the reinsurance process
avoids large losses to any one insurer partly through spreading large risks
among individual insurers. Additionally, the short durations of the
privately underwritten policies allow insurers to redress any imbalances in
the insurance pool fairly swiftly and respresent another attempt to avoid
large losses.
Political risk insurance in the private sector, similar to OPIC insurance
and other insurance in general, further addresses moral hazard and adverse
selection effects by employing its own forms of deductibles, exclusions,
and coinsurance. Typical waiting periods of 180 to 720 days function to
deter risky behavior by requiring insureds to bear a portion of lost profits
and interest, as does the one year waiting period in OPIC policies. Lloyd's
is notably the only major player not requiring a waiting period.47 Again,
like those underwritten by OPIC, policies offered by the private sector
commonly exclude self-inflicted losses and often require the presence of
insurance to remain confidential." Lastly, coinsurance provisions in the
44. See, e.g., Indemnity Marine, supra note 31, at 11; POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL RISKS,
supra note 29, at 10-15.
45. PoLmcAL AND FINANCIAL RISKS, supra note 29, at 11-12.
46. Radcliffe, Profit in Political Risk, TIE REvIEw, Mar. 1987, at 17.
47. PoLmcAL AND FINANCIAL RISKS, supra note 29, at 5-15.
48. Id at 5-6. The R.J. Merrett 1981 Wording employed by Lloyd's of London
includes both a due diligence warranty stating, "[w]arranted that the Assured shall use due
diligence and do and concur in doing all things reasonably practicable to avoid or diminish
any loss hereunder and to secure compensation for any such loss," and a confidentiality
warranty stating, "[w]arranted that the Assured shall not disclose the existence of this
policy to any third party without prior approval of Underwriters." PRIVATE INSURANCE
MARKET, supra note 42, at 3.
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private sector almost uniformly require the insured to bear ten percent of
losses, the same figure appearing in OPIC provisions. '9 On their face, the
deductibles, exclusions, and coinsurance provisions appear no more
remarkable than those in OPIC's policies and are there simply to make the
schemes work.
These provisions serve to complete the structure and resolve the initial
problems of constructing a viable insurance scheme to cover political risk,
by which the private market creates its own policies, terms, and condi-
tions-some resembling OPIC terms, others quite unique. Of significant
difference, behind the organizational structure and contractual terms, is that
in the private sector profit necessarily drives the process and determines
the policies. Unlike in the public sector, where pressures to provide
foreign aid to less developed countries inspired the establishment of
schemes like OPIC, only the potential for profits should direct private
insurers.
Certainly, viable, profitable political risk insurance schemes operate in
the private sector and have done so before OPIC began operations. Need
created the demand for policies; potential profits spurred insurers to supply
their underwriting capacity. The nagging question remains as to why the
private insurance market offers only a limited capacity for political risk
insurance, a pattern that does not appear to be changing." Uncertainties
in estimating political risk and the dangers of miscalculation only partly
explain the limited size of the private political risk insurance market and
completely fail to explain why the capacity in that market is so much
smaller than that available from public agencies, which face essentially the
same problems in offering overseas investment insurance. The reasons lie
one step beyond the basic structures and conditions that both characterize
the political risk insurance market and enable it to function. Restrictions
on the availability of private sector political risk insurance are only
explained within the overall context of the insurance market; they emerge
as inherent market restrictions from which OPIC and other government
insurers ironically remain free as public agencies.
The key feature of the market for insurance entails the reality that the
presence of profits in a certain field of insurance does not automatically
guarantee the availability of the capacity to underwrite that particular type
of insurance. What will matter and be most important for political risk
49. PRIVATE INSURANCE MARKET, supra note 42, at 4. Note, however, that AIG
usually provides coverage for 100% of the net loss for confiscation and 90% for currency
inconvertibility. PRIVATE INSuRANCE MARKET, supra note 42, app. H, at 1.
50. See Active Underwriter, supra note 31, at 5.
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insurance is its relative profitability in comparison with the other insurance
schemes private insurers could underwrite. The essential nature of the
insurance market, similar to any market, requires that the capacity available
on the part of underwriters compete for the most profitable insurance. In
essence, a scheme that has proven profitable simply may not be profitable
enough to succeed in the face of competition and finite underwriting
capacity.i5
The insurance market notably displays one other prominent feature, the
cyclical fluctuations in underwriting capacity that tend to vary with the
general health of the economy. Since uncertainties in political risk
insurance lower its profitability relative to other types of insurance,
fluctuations in capacity affect the private political risk insurance market
greater than they affect other more profitable areas of insurance. Cyclical
variations not only limit the capacity available for political risk insurance,
but additionally work against small insurers and new entrants. Because
political risk insurance requires a high level of expertise, only large,
experienced insurers will likely survive the fluctuations in underwriting
capacity.
Although prohibitively high premium levels (high relative to the
subsidized public sector political risk insurance schemes) have been
pointed out as accounting for the limited private political risk insurance
market,52 that explanation fails to account for either the realities of
premium levels or the workings of the insurance market. First, recall that
private market premium levels do not necessarily exceed those granted by
government sponsored programs and that in many instances the private
sector offers comparable, less expensive coverage.53 Furthermore and
most importantly, premium rates should not be the limiting factor. Any
premiums for which potential insureds decline coverage would be better
examined in terms of the level of risk an investor was willing to bear itself.
If the rate was perceived as excessive and investors were willing to bear
losses themselves, then something should be wrong with the premium
51. PRIVATE INSURANCE MARKET, supra note 42, at 7-8.
Reinsurers, whose capacity is similarly finite must decide how most profitably
to deploy this capacity, whether in political risk insurance or in any other form
of insurance .... As capacity is directly related to capital for commercial
companies, underwriters always seek to obtain the best return on the written
premium income consistent with maintaining a balanced portfolio of risk.
Id
52. See, e.g., Allen & Viscusi, supra note 5, at 160.
53. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
2211992]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
calculation; that is, the premiums must not be equal to expected losses but
must exceed them, making insurance economically irrational.
Unwillingness on the part of investors to insure, similarly provides an
unsatisfactory explanation for the limited size of the private political risk
insurance market. Once again, a reluctance to insure when premiums equal
expected losses would be irrational. While true that, in certain cases,
depending on the rates available through the private sector or through
OPIC, investors accustomed to a cheaper government sponsored program
might hesitate in switching to a private scheme and while an investor no
longer eligible for OPIC insurance might conceivably elect to bear losses
itself to maintain its planned budget rather than pay higher rates through
private insurers, in general investors should be willing to insure so long as
premiums do not exceed expected loss.
Rather than prohibitive premium levels or irrational investor behavior,
fluctuations in reinsurance and insurance capacity best explain the
limitations on the private market for political risk insurance. For the most
part, relative profitability, and not the strict level of profits, accounts for
limitations on the market for privately underwritten political risk insurance.
Statistical analysis of profitability and relative profitability over time is,
unfortunately, made virtually impossible in large part by the insurers
themselves. No statistics or information on the profit history of political
risk insurance schemes are publicly available and private insurers carefully
guard any existing information they collect in the course of their own
analyses.' Inferences on profitability must be drawn from the volume of
business underwritten and that volume has remained strictly limited among
private insurers.
Of course, the private market for overseas investment insurance finds
itself affected by the presence of competition from government sponsored
schemes and in many cases comparable coverage will be available through
both the public and private sectors. Compared with public schemes,
private insurance offers some advantages to potential investors, particularly
in areas excluded from cover under the public sector programs, but in
many cases insureds will seek coverage under schemes like OPIC when
their investments are eligible.
Private insurers' advantages include flexibility, such as the ability to
underwrite an investment anywhere. None of the national considerations
delimiting OPIC political risk insurance affect the operations of private
insurers. In only one case, war risk, are private insurers restricted from
54. Letter from N. A. Alington, Hogg Robinson Gardner Mountain Group, Credit and
Political Division, to Elizabeth A. Kessler (Feb. 27, 1990) (on file with the New York Law
School Journal of International and Comparative Law).
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underwriting political risk insurance and that limitation results from an
international treaty, the Waterborne Agreement, to which most insurers are
a party and by which they agree not to offer coverage against war or civil
strife on land-based assets.-- AIG and most groups enact this provision
by excluding coverage of all loss due to war, while Lloyd's excludes all
loss due to war between the five nations of the United Nations Security
Council.56 In spite of this limitation, private underwriters generally tend
to be free from all restrictions except those of the marketplace; commenta-
tors have concluded that lack of war cover does not seriously impede the
private sector.
5 7
The point: Precisely because of their participation in the market,
private insurers are restricted by limited capacity and cyclical fluctuations,
restrictions that ultimately prove more severe than those legislative
provisions defining the public political risk insurance schemes. When the
public sector effectively offers greater capacity, that is where the insureds
will be found.
An assortment of other general factors do play some role in explaining
the relative small private market for private risk insurance, but with limited
effect. The three year policy periods employed in the privately underwrit-
ten policies, while necessary to protect insurers, limit their attractiveness
to potential insureds, especially when compared with substantially longer
twenty year OPIC periods. The far shorter periods of the private insurance
policies can partly explain the tenuous confidence on the part of investors.
Investors may be unwilling to insure large, long term investments when
their insurers retain the option of refusing to reissue their policies at
expiration, even if most policies can, in practice, be rolled over to make
coverage continuous. Limited policy periods alone, nevertheless, cannot
account for the small size of the private political risk insurance market,
especially when that market retains the attraction of high flexibility.
Of course, inexperience and lack of expertise further handicap private
insurers in assessing expected loss and calculating the most efficient
premium rates. The uncertainties in profitability in political risk insurance
schemes, whether public or private, contribute to limit both sectors from
attaining their most efficient level, thus probably keeping premiums slightly
elevated from their theoretically most efficient level, a level impossible to
calculate. But private insurers are worse off. Not only is entry into the
private-sector political risk insurance market difficult, but even private
55. PRIVATE INSURANCE MARKET, supra note 42, at 9.
56. Ma ann. C.
57. Id at 9.
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underwriters currently offering political risk insurance lack the information
and experience possessed by the United States, which is gained through its
permanent establishments in foreign countries and its experienced officials
in Washington. Private insurers admit to relying heavily on information
provided by insureds when assessing risk in particular countries."
Finally, some isolated disastrous claims experiences (particularly in
industries that seem more likely targets of expropriation because of their
importance to a nation's economy or resources) made private insurers more
selective and explain some limits on the availability of political risk
insurance. 59  Again, these factors point out selected difficulties in
underwriting successful overseas investment insurance policies but cannot
explain why OPIC and other similar national schemes have been so
successful in the business vis-a-vis private insurers.
Explaining what restricts the availability of private sector political risk
insurance under conditions in which it would otherwise generate a profit
helps justify the small private market, but it does not account for the
success of OPIC political risk insurance. The private sector underwrites
political risk insurance in most instances in which it is profitable. To the
contrary, OPIC continues not solely because of its profitability, but by
providing a service valuable enough to the United States to be backed by
the full faith and credit of the United States Treasury.
m. OPIC INSURANCE AS FOREIGN POLICY
While private sector political risk insurance developed as a profitable
outgrowth of marine insurance, the United States Congress designed OPIC
overseas investment insurance primarily to enact foreign policy goals more
inexpensively, not to earn a profit. OPIC's enabling statute states that
OPIC's purpose is "to mobilize and facilitate the participation of the United
States private capital and skills in the economic and social development of
58. Paul, supra note 27, at 717. Not only do the applications for insurance cover
detailed questions on the risk involved but insurers also employ contractual terms to
guarantee their access to any potentially relevant information. For example, a model
provision in a typical privately underwritten political risk insurance contract states that
The Assured shall submit to examination under oath, and shall produce for
examination, at such reasonable place as is designated by the Underwriters or
their representatives, all documents in their possession or control which relate
to the matters in question, and shall permit extracts and copies thereof to be
made.
POLmCAL AND FINANCIAL RISKS, supra note 29, ann. 1, at 3.
59. Indemnity Marine, supra note 31, at 29.
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less developed friendly countries and areas .... " Commentators tend
to agree that overseas investment insurance, in effect, provides low-cost aid
to developing nations." Effecting an insurance scheme to serve develop-
mental objectives and various other assorted congressional aims should
alter the nature of the scheme and limit its potential profitability.
Ironically, even in the presence of these restrictions, OPIC's success, when
compared with that of the private sector, results from the fact that OPIC's
limitations are of little significance in comparison with the benefits it
enjoys from the support of the full faith and credit of the United States and
from its freedom from having to maximize profits across a range of
insurance products. OPIC's specialization and its importance for United
States foreign policy determine its success. OPIC's foreign policy success
justifies its political risk insurance programs.
The theory behind the goals the United States seeks to implement
through OPIC is simple. OPIC investment insurance aims to assist
economic development in less developed countries by specifically
encouraging private foreign investment that would otherwise be discour-
aged by the prospect of loss due to expropriation, currency inconvertibility,
or political violence. Unlike direct grants in aid or loans to less developed
countries' governments, OPIC investment insurance works by lowering the
perceived costs to private investment in order to bring technology, higher
employment, and foreign exchange into less developed nations at the
private sector's expense.
Foreign policy directives control the operation of OPIC insurance and
limit the category of investments OPIC may insure. For instance, OPIC
may not offer insurance for investments in countries with a higher per
capita income than less developed countries. OPIC is authorized to "give
preferential consideration to investment projects in less developed countries
that have per capita incomes of $984 or less... and restrict its activities
with respect to investment projects in less developed countries having per
capita incomes of $4,269 .... , Other goals further restrict OPIC's
60. OPIC HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 3. OPIC's enabling statute states as its purpose,
"to mobilize and facilitate the participation of United States private capital and skills in the
economic and social development of less developed friendly countries and areas, thereby
complementing the development assistance objectives of the United States...." 22
U.S.C. § 2191 (1991).
61. Franklin & West, supra note 14, at 8-9 ("Reasonably priced, comprehensive
insurance against the major political risks has proven to be a low-cost public policy that
over the years has successfully encouraged an increased flow of private investment to
selected countries." ).
62. 22 U.S.C. § 2191(2) (1988).
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capacity to act as an underwriter. OPIC's authorizing statute requires
preferential consideration be given to investments made by small business-
es.' Presumably, these businesses are particularly unwilling or unable to
face the risks associated with overseas investment in less developed areas.
Furthermore, before issuing a policy, OPIC must determine what impact
insuring a particular investment will have on the United States' labor
market and balance of payments." In spite of these apparent restrictions,
OPIC's political risk insurance enjoys continuing financial success.
The policy goals underlying OPIC's investment insurance scheme not
only tie conditions on investments seeking insurance, but the significance
of those development goals leads the United States to guarantee the scheme
with its full faith and credit. The United States does so, notwithstanding
the scheme's inherent limitations and uncertainties, precisely because it is
less expensive than other means to achieve its goals. The economic
backing of the United States makes the scheme more successful than
private political risk insurance because, first, it compensates for problems
in applying an overseas insurance scheme, particularly the unavoidable un-
certainties in estimating risk that make premiums and expected loss
difficult to assess; second, United States support compensates for the
conditions placed on OPIC by its enabling statute, which limit the risks it
insures and its pool of insureds; and third, it frees OPIC from the
constraints of having to earn the largest profits possible.
Although OPIC insurance does run a profit and its experience with
claims has been commended,65 it has been operating for only twenty
years, and given the volatility of the risks involved, some provision must
be made for the possibility of potentially large and unanticipated claims
caused by imprecise risk assessment. In fact, one explanation for the
shrinkage of private political risk insurance by over forty percent in the
past several years can be attributed to large losses experienced by Lloyd's
of London, which included a $50 million loss in the Sudan from non-pay-
ment due to currency inconvertibility." Even in its best times the private
market never approached the size of the public sector's capacity to
underwrite political risk insurance.
63. 22 U.S.C. § 2200 (1988) ("The Corporation shall undertake... to broaden the
participation of United States small businesses, corporatives, and other small United States
investors in the development of small private enterprise in less developed friendly countries
or areas.").
64. 22 U.S.C. § 2191(h) (1988).
65. See generally Peter R. Gilbert, Expropriations and the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation, 9 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 515 (1977).
66. Bullitt & Lagomarsino, supra note 4, at 300.
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IV. CONCLUSION
OPIC insurance has been able to counteract the inevitable uncertainties
it faces through the full faith and credit of the United States. The United
States in turn offers this support because it is cheaper than other means
available to achieve its development goals and live up to its promises to
less developed countries. In comparison, the private sector has no such
motivation. While the private sector of the insurance market lacks access
to confidential State Department information, lacks the means to dispose
of local currency it may be forced to buy back in the event of inconvert-
ibility, and while it may also lack clout in negotiations with foreign
governments,' more importantly, private insurers see no overarching
justification to underwrite investment insurance policies and they simply
see higher, more consistent profits elsewhere. As market players
constrained by the rules of the free market, they must seek normal profits,
ultimately at the expense of less profitable political risk insurance.
67. Shanks, supra note 1, at 432; see also Bulfitt & Lagomarsino, supra note 4, at 302.
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